We prove that if BPP 6 = EXP, then every problem in BPP can be solved deterministically in subexponential time on almost every input on every samplable ensemble for in nitely many input sizes. This is the rst derandomization result for BPP based on uniform, noncryptographic hardness assumptions. It implies the following gap in the average-instance complexities of problems in BPP: either these complexities are always sub-exponential or they contain arbitrarily large exponential functions.
1 Introduction, History, and Intuition
Motivation
The introduction of randomization into e cient computation has been one of the most fertile and useful ideas in computer science. In cryptography and asynchronous computing, randomization makes possible tasks that are impossible to perform deterministically. E v en for function computation, many examples are known in which randomization allows considerable savings in resources like space and time over deterministic algorithms, or even only" simpli es them. But to what extent is this seeming power of randomness over determinism real? The most famous concrete version of this question regards the power of BPP, the class of problems solvable by probabilistic polynomial time algorithms making small constant error. What is the relative p o wer of such algorithms compared to deterministic ones? This is largely open. On the one hand, it is possible that P = BPP, i.e., randomness is useless for solving new problems in polynomial time. On the other, we might h a ve BPP = EXP, which w ould say that randomness would be a nearly omnipotent tool for algorithm design. A priori, neither extreme seems likely: there are some problems where randomness seems exponentially helpful, but many hard problems are not susceptible to randomized solutions.
In this paper, we show that the intuition that randomness is a resource basically incomparable to time is wrong. Either there is a non-trivial deterministic simulation of BPP, o r BPP = EXP! Either time can non-trivially substitute for randomness, or randomness can non-trivially substitute for time. In other words, either universal de-randomization is possible, or randomization is a panacea for intractability. There are some technical provisos: the deterministic simulation only works for in nitely many input lengths, and may fail on a negligible fraction of inputs even of these lengths. We consider the former much more plausible than the latter.
History: Hardness vs. Randomness
While counter to most people's rst intuition, our result should be less surprising to those who are aware of the literature on de-randomization. The fundamental paradigm in de-randomization is to trade hardness" for randomness". This was rst elucidated in the remarkable sequence of papers 22, 6, 24 . Roughly speaking, computationally hard" functions can be used to construct e cient pseudo-random generators". These in turn lower the randomness requirements of any e cient probabilistic algorithm, allowing for a nontrivial" deterministic simulation. In many such results, there is a quantitative trade-o between the hardness assumption and the time to perform the deterministic simulation. The stronger the assumption, the faster the simulation. Here, we are concentrating on the low end" of the curve in this trade-o : what is the weakest assumption one can make and still have some version of universal derandomization? Our results also have some implications for the higher end" of the curve, but these are much less clean, and we will not fully describe them in this abstract.
We will thus compare our results mainly to the low end" version of the known results. In particular, we will use as our standard for nontrivial" the class SUBEXP = 0 DTIME2 n . The statement BPP SUBEXP read randomness is weak", while falling short of P = BPP, would be a great result to prove unconditionally, and it certainly implies BPP 6 = EXP.
There have been a sequence of papers getting weaker and weaker hardness assumptions sucient to prove such a result. These papers use one of three basic methods for converting hard functions into pseudo-random sequences: the cryptographically secure" BMY-type pseudorandom generator based on one-way functions 6, 2 4 , 16, 7, 8 , 1 1 ; the NW-generator based on a Boolean function with no circuit that approximates it 21, 3 ; and the hitting set method 1, 2 .
To state our results, we will need some notation for complexity classes. Let SizeT n be the class of functions computable by circuit families where the number of gates in the circuit with n inputs is at most Tn. For C a complexity class and tn a function, let C=tn be the class of functions computable in C with tn bits of advice" depending only on the input size, i.e., f 2 C=tn 9 g 2 C and a function h : Z ! Z with jhnj tn and fx = gx; hjxj. A result of 15 shows that P=poly = c1 Sizen c . For C a complexity class, let i:o:,C be the class of functions that agree with a function in C for all inputs of length n for in nitely many n. The rst set of papers construct a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function. The pseudo-random generator quickly converts a small random string to a polynomially larger string that seems random in the following sense: Any adversary that can distinguish an output of this generator from a truly random string of the same length can be used to invert the function. A BPP algorithm that had a markedly di erent behaviour on a pseudo-random input than a random one would be such a n a d v ersary. S o i f n o such i n vertor exists, the deterministic algorithm that enumerates the multi-set of outputs of the generator and simulates the BPP algorithm on each, taking the majority answer, would always be correct. Informally, this is stated as: Theorem A 1 6, 24, 8, 7, 11 If there a r e one-way functions that cannot be inverted with a non-negligible probability in P=poly, then However, we might still be able to get an average-case" simulation under a uniform assumption. In fact, what such a result would say i s that it is infeasible to nd inputs for which such a simulation fails. We need to be somewhat careful in de ning average-case complexity of a problem. We actually want to examine the di culty of the problem for most instances" rather than the average of the di culties. We also should say what kinds of errors the algorithm is allowed to make on the exceptional instances. An algorithm allowed to output mistakes on a small number of inputs will be called a heuristic" for the problem, whereas an algorithm that simply fails to give an answer in the alloted time will be called an algorithm with a certain average-case performance. Here, we'll use somewhat ad hoc de nitions of these concepts that have certain technical advantages for our setting, especially when making statements about in nitely many" sizes..
De nition 1 A probability ensemble = f n jn 2 Z + g. i s a s e quence o f p r obability distributions on the set of strings of length n. The ensemble is polynomially sampleable if there is a polynomial p a n d a p olynomial time computable function M so that if R 2 U f0; 1g pn , then Mn; R is distributed a c cording to n . A s usual, we can extend this notion to allow M access to an oracle, in which case we say is polynomially sampleable given the oracle.
Let T and be functions of n. HeurTIME n Tn is the class of pairs f; of functions f : f0; 1g ! f 0; 1g and probability ensembles so that there is an algorithm Ax running in deterministic time Tjxj so that 8n, for x 2 n f0; 1g n , P r o b Ax 6 = fx n. AvgTIME n Tn is the class of pairs f; of functions f : f0; 1g ! f 0; 1g and probability ensembles so that there is an algorithm Ax running in deterministic time Tjxj so that Ax 2 f fx; ?g and for all n, for x 2 n f0; 1g n , P r o b Ax 6 = fx n.
If membership in one of the above classes holds for f together with any polynomially sampleable ensemble, then we omit mention of the ensemble and simply say that f is in the class. The same abuse of notation will be used for complexity classes being subsets of the above classes.
Under cryptographic assumptions, the standard techniques give a verage-case" simulations. From uniformly one-way functions, we can generate pseudorandom sequences that are hard for probabilistic algorithms, rather than circuits, to distinguish. An informal statement of the resulting derandomization is: Theorem A 4 6, 24, 8, 7, 11 If there are uniformly one-way functions, then for every c 0, BPP Heur 1=n c SUBEXP and ZPP Avg 1=n c SUBEXP.
Our Results
The main result of this paper is a version of this theorem based on the much w eaker assumption We also give a sharp converse:
Theorem 
Why w asn't this paper written in 1988?
The rest of this section describes intuitively the obstacles to obtaining this result long ago, and the key ideas we use to overcome them. Attempts to nd a uniform version of the above result namely, replacing P=poly by BPP in the hardness assumption followed immediately after its discovery in 1988, both by the authors and many others. However, the following presented a psychological barrier:
The proofs of the before-mentioned theorems have the following structure. A presumably hard function f is used to construct a hopefully pseudorandom generator G. Equivalently, one starts with a hypothetical distinguisher for G, and constructs from it an e cient algorithm for f, obtaining a contradiction. In the nonuniform versions the distinguisher and algorithm are circuits, and only an existence proof of the later from the former is required. In the uniform case, both are probabilistic Turing machines.
The construction of an algorithm for f from a distinguisher of G, follows a sequence of steps. Various steps in this construction seem to inherently need values of f at many often random points. While this is easy if f was the inverse of a one-way function or nonuniformly hard-wire these values, such v alues seem impossible to obtain uniformly for an arbitrary function in EXP.
Here we take a careful look at the steps mentioned above. It was already known that for some of them Random Self Reducibility 19, 4 , 5 , Hard Core Bit theorem 8 the circuit construction is already uniform. More importantly, i n the other steps the XOR Lemma 24 , the generator conversion 20, 21 , function values of f are the only nonuniform construct needed. Thus, the rst key idea is allowing our P P TProbabilistic Polynomial Time algorithm to have a n oracle for f.
At rst sight it seems ridiculous to give an algorithm trying to compute f an access to an oracle for f. H o wever, we don't merely want to compute f on a single input, but to construct a circuit computing f on all inputs. This, one could state the issue of whether such a construction exists as whether f is learnable from examples in the sense of computational learning theory. W e show that a distinguisher for the pseudo-random generator can be used to learn how to compute the hard function from examples.
So we get the following informal partial result: if an NW-generator based on any f 2 EXP is not pseudo-random, then a circuit for f can be constructed in P P T f . We still need to convert this into a construction of such a circuit with no oracle calls. This is not trivial. However, a crucial observation is that in the construction above the use of the oracle is limited in the following way: it is never called on larger input lengths than those of the circuit it constructs. How can this help to eliminate the oracle? The next key idea is assuming for no good reason so far that f happens to be downward self reducible like S A T or PERMA-NENT. In such cases observe that the oracle for f is redundant: to construct a circuit for f n , simply use the above PPT algorithm, and whenever it calls the oracle, use the downward self reduction and the inductively constructed circuits of smaller sizes.
It remains to justify the assumption that f is downward self reducible. This seems a strange assumption, since downward self-reducible problems are always in P S P A C Eand our f is supposed to be complete for EXP. However, we have a n a d v antage: we know that the only way the NW generator fails is if EXP P=poly, and then it follows from 15 and 23 that EXP = 2 = P P . 1 So if the NW generator fails with a standard EXP-complete problem, we try again with a downward self-reducible P -complete problem which w e then know is also EXP-complete. If the simulation still fails, we can use it to solve the P complete problem, and hence any problem in EXP. W e will pick f to be our favorite randomself-reducible and downward self-reducible function complete for P, a v ariation of the permanent function.
2 Proof of Theorem 5
Overview
We w ant to show that derandomization is possible given BPP 6 = EXP. As mentioned above , since 21 show that BPP i:o:,SUBEXP assuming EXP 6 P=poly, w e can assume EXP P=poly.
Furthermore, 15 observed that if this is true, then EXP = 2 . The proof of this can be sketched as follows. Let f be the function that, give n a T uring Machine that runs in time 2 n , a n input of length n and the name of a cell in the tableau for the machine, outputs the contents of that cell. f is EXP-complete. Given a circuit C, the question Does C compute f on all inputs of length n?" is in Co-NP, since if not, one can exhibit an input on which the circuit fails, and a previous inconsistent nite block in the tableau. Thus, if small circuits for f exist, one can non-deterministically guess one, and then conon-deterministically verify it. So if f 2 P=poly; then f 2 2 . 2 By Toda's Theorem 23 , then EXP = P P and so the permament function is complete for EXP. 23 . Thus, we can assume that computing the permanent is not possible in BPP. The permanent has two nice properties that we will use. First, it is random self-reducible 19 , 1 The result from 15 does not relativize 13 , which suggests that similar methods might lead to nonrelativizing separations. However, we are unsure whether our main result relativizes. 2 3 get the stronger result, If EXP P=poly then EXP = MA . so its average-case and worst-case di culty for BPP are equivalent. Secondly, one can solve the permanent in polynomial time using an oracle for the permanent of smaller matrices. We call this property d o wnward self-reducibility. W e will assume we h a ve a function f = 2 BPP with these properties.
Let f n be f restricted to inputs of size n. F or each input size n, w e will construct a pseudorandom generator G n from n c bits for some xed constant c, t o n d bits for an arbitrary d c , that will be computable in polynomial time with an oracle for f n . Given a circuit that distinguishes the output of this generator from truly random strings, we will be able to construct a circuit computing f on n bit strings, in polynomial-time with an oracle for f n .
The simulation of a BPP algorithm is as follows. Let 0 be given. On inputs of size k, assume the BPP algorithm uses k c1 random bits and time. Set n = k =2c . Using d = 2 cc 1 = , w e construct the range of G n , a set of n d = k c1 bit strings, in time 2 On c = O2 k . We then simulate the BPP algorithm on each element o f t h e range and take the majority v ote.
Assume the above algorithm is incorrect with probability 1 =k d with respect to some sampleable distribution k on k-bit strings, for all but nitely many k. Then given n, w e can set k = n 2c= and through random sampling k , nd instances x 1 ; :::x k O1 in probabilistic polynomial-time s o that the with high probability the algorithm fails on at least one x i . Translating the behaviour of the BPP algorithm on x i into a circuit, we get a polynomial-time probabilistic construction which produces a collection D 1 ; ::D r so that at least one D i distinguishes outputs of G n from truly random strings.
Working through the constructions from 21, 3 , we show that from such a distinguisher we can construct a circuit for f n in probabilistic polynomial-time using an oracle for f n . W e then get out of this Catch 2 2 b y using a bootstrapping argument as follows. Assume we h a ve a circuit C n,1 for f n,1 . Since f is downward selfreducible, we can simulate an oracle for f n using C n, 1 . W e construct a set D 1 ; ::D r as above that contains a distinguisher for G n . W e can nd this distinguisher, since we can use our oracle for f n to sample from the range of G n and hence estimate the distinguishing probability. W e then use it to construct a circuit C n computing f n .
The key observation is that the size of C n does not depend on the size of C n,1 , since C n,1 was only used as an oracle. So unlike the situation if we used the downward reduction directly in such a construction, we do not get an exponential blow-up in size.
Reductions between construction problems
Most of the algorithms we'll use will be probabilistic polynomial time algorithms whose inputs and outputs will be encodings of Boolean circuits. We'll be interested in statements, If one can construct a circuit with property X , then from it one can construct a circuit with property Y". Because to formalize such a statement requires some quanti cation, it is helpful to have some general notation for such reductions. For our paper, one can think of each construction problem as specifying a type of circuit, and one can think of n as the number of inputs to these circuits.
De nition 2 A construction problem A = fA n g is a family of non-empty subsets A n f0; 1g . Note that no upper bound is put on the sizes of members of A n in terms of n. In the below de nitions, the probabilities are taken over the uniform distribution on n bit strings.
De nition 3 Important Construction Problems Circuits approximating f Let f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g and : N ! 0; 1 . De ne the construction problem C f; by C f; n contains all circuits C with n inputs satisfying P r Cx = fx n. Circuits computing f C f = C f;1 . Distinguishers Let m : N ! N, G = fG n : f0; 1g mn ! f 0; 1g n , and as before. We also adopt the same length restriction for the familiar e cient T uring reduction among functions.
De nition 6 Let f;g : f0; 1g ! f 0; 1g , and let`: Z + ! Z + . We say that f is polynomial Turing reducible to g restricted to length`n, and write f n pT g` n , if there is a deterministic 3 polynomial time oracle machine M g that on every input x outputs fx and queries the oracle g only on inputs of length at most`jxj. f is downward self-reducible if f n pT f n,1 .
Let ModPerm be the following decision problem:
Instance: An integer k in unary, a prime p 2k in unary, a kk matrix M of integers modulo p, and an integer t modulo p.
Problem: Is P e r m Mmodp = t?, where P e r m is the usual permanent function.
Note that it is easy to generate random valid instances of ModPerm of a given length, and to place them in one-to-one correspondence with integers up to the number of valid instances. So without loss of generality, b y uniform" distribution on length n strings for ModPerm, w e mean uniform on the valid instances of length n. ModPerm is downward self-reducible by the usual method of computing permanent via minors. By using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, it is easy to see that computing the permanent for an arbitrary matrix of integers reduces to ModPerm, so it is complete for P. The selfreducibility for permanent modulo a prime 2k due to Lipton 19 using the method of 4 shows that ModPerm is random self-reducible according to the above de nition. In the sequel, the reader can think of f as ModPerm, although we prefer to state things in more general terms.
Lemma 11 There i s a P complete decision problem that is downward self-reducible and random self-reducible.
Now w e can sketch the outline of the proof in terms of the de nitions above. Let f be a random self-reducible and downward self-reducible function, like ModPerm. W e will de ne in the next subsection the NW-generator G f . Assuming that G f is not pseudo-random, we will conclude that f 2 BPP.
The sketch is as follows:
Lemma 12 G fn pT f n .
This will be immediate from the construction of G, given in the next sub-section. Lemma The proof was sketched before. Assume the simulation based on computing the range of G f and taking the BPP algorithm on this range fails with probability 1 =n c for all but nitely many n. Then we can sample a random instance and use the corresponding circuit as our distinguisher. is strongly probabilistic polynomial-time constructible using oracle f n This follows from the previous two lemmas. We can repeatedly sample from using the weak construction. For each circuit we construct, we can estimate its distinguishing probability b y sampling from the range of G f using the oracle for f n , since G f pT f n . Lemma 15 If f is random-self-reducible, then D Gf ;1=5 ! fn C f This is the main technical lemma, and will be proved in sub-section 2.4. However, it really just examines the proofs of the known results.
Lemma 16 If f is downward self-reducible, and C f is strongly polynomial-time constructible using oracle f n then f 2 BPP Proof. We recursively compute circuits C 1 2 C f 1 ; ::C n 2 C f n . W e then output C n evaluated at our input. Say that we h a ve computed C i . W e run the construction for C f i+1 with oracle f i+1 with = 1 =n 2 , simulating queries to f i+1 by M Ci , where M is the poly-time oracle Turing Machine from the de nition of downward selfreducibility.
Note that jC i+1 j Time taken by the construction not counting oracle queries*Time taken to simulate queries not counting the time to evaluate oracle calls by M. This is a xed polynomial in n, independent of the size of C i .
Since each jC i j is bounded by this xed polynomial in n, the time for each stage including time to evaluate oracle calls by M is a xed polynomial in n. Also, the probability that C n 6 2 C f n is at most n = 1 =n, so the error is bounded.
Combining the above, we get: Lemma 17 If BPP 6 i:o: , HeurTIME n ,c2 n then f 2 BPP for every downward and random self-reducible function f. I n p articular, ModPerm 2 BPP so BPP = P .
As described earlier, this su ces to prove Theorem 5 for the case of BPP. F or ZPP we just need to note that the simulation is error-free, but may not nd a halting computation. The rest is identical.
Construction of G f
We view the construction of G f as a sequence of three steps, in order to make the proof more modular. The sequence we use below is not exactly the one used in 21, 3 , but the original one would work as well.
Let d 0 b e a n i n teger. Let c 0 be the constant so that C f ! C 1,n ,c ;f . Direct product function Let n 1 = n c+2 .
View an n 1 bit string as n c+1 n bit strings. De ne g : f0; 1g n1 ! f 0; 1g n c+1 by gx 1 ; ::x n = fx 1 ; ::fx n .
Hard-core bit Let n 2 = n 1 +n c+1 . View an n 2 bit string as an input to g x and a string r of length jgxj. Then hx; r = g x; r , where y ; z represents inner product modulo 2.
Almost disjoint sets generator Let m = n 2 2 . Let z 2 f 0; 1g m and let S = fs 1 s 2 :: s n2 g be a subset of bit positions betwe e n 1 t o m. Then de ne zj S to be the n 2 bit string z s1 z s2 :::z sn 2 . In 21 , an explicit construction of`such sets S 1 ,..S`is given so that jS i S j j log n`f or every i 6 = j. W e de ne G : f0; 1g m ! f 0; 1g`by Gz = hzj S1 ; h zj S2 ; :::hzj S` .
From the construction, it is clear that G m pT h n2 pT g n1 pT f n , which proves Lemma 12.
Proof of Lemma 15
We w ork through the construction in reverse order, showing how to construct, from a distinguisher for G m , a circuit for f n . There will be four stages in this construction, the rst three corresponding to the three levels of the de nition of G and the last stage to the random selfreduction of f. All stages are identical to those from the non-uniform proofs, but we need to verify that the use of non-uniformity can be replaced by an oracle for f n . W e'll just review the constructions from other papers, to see that they are polytime computable from such an oracle, and refer to the relevant papers for proofs of correctness.
The four stages we need are given by the fol- By random sampling using the oracle for h n2 , estimate the probability that Cx = hx; if greater than 1=2 + :05=`, output C, else repeat.
21 show that the expected probability of success for C is at least 1=2 + :1=`, so the number of repetitions before outputting a C that has good advantage is at most On` with very high probability.
Lemma 19 follows directly from 8 .
Proof. Lemma 20 is the uniform version of a direct product lemma which has many proofs 16, 9, 14 . We present here the construction from 14 as being simple to describe.
Let C 2 C g; n1 . Construct C 0 as follows: Let n 3 = n 1 =n = n c+1 . Repeat for r = 1 t o n 3 = .
Pick i 2 U f1; ::n 3 g. F or each j 6 = i , pick x j 2 U f0; 1g n , query fx j and record the answer. Flip coins until a head arises or until n tails have been ipped; let t 1 be the number of ips. Let C 0 r be the following three-valued circuit: On input x, compute t , the number of bit positions j 6 = i where the j'th bit of Cx 1 ; ::x i,1 ; x ; x i+1 ; ::x n3 disagrees with fx j as recorded. If t t 1 output the i'th bit of Cx 1 ; ::x i,1 ; x ; x i+1 ; ::x n3 ; otherwise output reject". Let C 0 be the circuit that outputs the majority answer from those C 0 r that do not reject. 14 prove that, for non-neglegible , C 0 2 C f;1,n ,c with high probability. I f is at least inverse polynomial, the construction takes polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof.
We construct a problem in E P=poly that cannot be approximated in T I M E 2 on =on as follows. The idea is that some function from a universal family of hash functions will serve our purpose.
For any input of size n, w e rst simulate all machines with descriptions of size :1n on all advice strings of size :1n for 2 n steps on all inputs. If they don't halt, record the answer as say 0. This gives us at most 2 :2n strings truth tables of N = 2 n bits each. Let H be a family of 2 On pairwise independent hash functions from n bits to 1 bit. For example, H = f0; 1g n ; h r x = r; x . Cosider them too as N-bit strings. Using Chebyshev bounds, one can see that a random h r 2 H agrees with a string in 2 3 N positions only with probability 1 =ON. Then since there are less than ON strings in our collection, we can nd a hash function that does not agree with any of them in 2 3 the bits. We pick this h r and output h r x.
Conclusions and Open Problems
Ideally, w e w ould hope that our results are a step towards proving BPP 6 = EXP. H o wever, our results provide reasons both to be optimistic and pessimistic about such a proof. On the one hand, our result makes such a result stronger, since it would show a positive simulation as well as a negative result. On the other, it clari es that the best way of attacking this problem is to continue along the lines of the de-randomization papers. It also shows that non-relativizing techniques can be useful in this area, so we need not be depressed by oracles where BPP = EXP. It also indicates that we do not need to prove circuit lower bounds to get such a result, so we should also be undaunted by the negative results on Natural Proofs. There are some more technical points our work raises. First, is an average-case derandomization all one can hope for under a uniform assumption?
If BPP 6 = EXP but EXP P=poly, w e h a ve a paradoxical situation: the simulation of randomness by determinism does not always work, but it is intractable to nd instances where it fails.
Can we somehow utilize this intractibility i n y et another layer of hardness vs. randomness tradeo s?
As can be seen, our main result is achieved essentially with no technical work. All that is taken from previous papers. On the other hand these papers are viewed from a somewhat di erent perspective in trying to make them uniform, which is subtle in some ways and raises some new questions regarding these issues.
The rst one is that the classical learning from a membership oracle" problem of computational learning theory arises naturally here. Let LEARN be the class functions for which this can be done e ciently, namely all f for which C f n is constructible in P P T fn . This class is quite interesting, and we trivially have:
